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ABSTRACT 
Holding strategic grain reserves to address food price hikes has received renewed attentions in recent 
years. This paper examines such a program in Ethiopia that has been successful in addressing several 
emergencies since the 1990s. The analysis suggests that the key ingredients behind the success are a 
unique institutional design, coordination during emergencies with food-based safety net programs, and 
keeping the grain stocks to a minimum. Institutional design is unique because, unlike similar agencies in 
other countries, Ethiopia’s Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration (EFSRA) is independent of 
price stabilization and hence is not engaged in buying and selling of grain. The paper also demonstrates 
that scaling up school feeding programs will generate additional food demand and an effective outlet for 
stock rotation; and that increasing the stock level for price stabilization will adversely affect both grain 
markets and the performance of the EFSRA.   
Keywords: Ethiopia, strategic grain reserves, agricultural price policies, safety net programs vi 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Maintaining grain reserves was, and in many countries still is, an integral part of agricultural price 
policies—interchangeably termed as food price stabilization, buffer stock policies, or dual pricing 
policies—in developing countries for several decades. In Ethiopia, such policies date back to the early 
1950s when Emperor Haile Selassie instituted the Grain Marketing Board (GMB). However, real control 
over food markets began when the socialist government came to power in 1974. Consistent with its 
ideology, the socialist government of Ethiopia instituted a wide range of controls over grain production 
and marketing. These included determination of annual quotas, restrictions on private grain trade and 
interregional grain movement, determination of days on which the local markets had to be held, and 
rationing of grain to urban consumers.
1
Yet, the government decided to establish strategic grain reserves in the early 1980s and continues 
to maintain it, despite changes in governments and substantial market liberalization since 1991. This 
background gives rise to three important questions: 
 Wholesale prices of cereals were administratively set for many 
provincial markets and changed little between 1976 and the late 1980s (Webb and von Braun 1994, 48). 
In other words, the government’s marketing board was in control of almost all aspects of markets.  
1.  Why did Ethiopia institute a separate grain reserve agency, even though its marketing 
board had total control over agricultural markets?  
2.  How compatible is the strategic grain reserve with overall market-oriented policies?  
3.  How has the strategic reserve system performed in terms of operational and institutional 
efficiency?  
Answers to these questions not only are important for Ethiopia but also have relevance for regional 
initiatives, such as the one endorsed by the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development 
(NEPAD),
2 and the ongoing debate triggered by the 2007–2008 food crisis over various proposals for 
holding grain reserves at regional and global levels.
3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes how the strategic grain reserve 
agency, now called the Emergency Food Security Reserve Administration (EFSRA), has evolved over 
time, and this is followed by a discussion on the organizational structure and management of EFSRA in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the results of the analysis on the operational performance with respect to 
optimal stock, efficiency of stock management, and operational costs. The linkages of EFSRA with 
emergencies and other food security programs are analyzed in Section 5. The report concludes with a 
summary and implications of the results. 
  
 
                                                       
1 For details, see Franzel, Colburn, and Degu (1989), Lirenso (1994), and Lemma (1996).  
2 The rationales and modalities for regional strategic reserves are discussed in FAO (2004) study conducted the NEPAD. 
3  The proposals include virtual reserves (von Braun and Torero 2009), rice reserve for Asia (Timmer 2009), as well as 
suggestions for financial reserves. For a detailed discussion on merits and demerits of various proposals, see Wright (2009).  2 
2.  RATIONALE AND EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC GRAIN RESERVES 
In Ethiopia, agricultural price control began in the mid-1970s when the socialist government, in line with 
its ideology, instituted a wide range of controls over grain production and marketing. Among other things, 
the public controls involved administratively fixing grain prices, setting up annual quotas, restricting 
private grain trade and interregional grain movement, and supplying grain ration to urban consumers. In 
other words, the government was in charge of almost all aspects of grain marketing in the country, 
including maintaining a large grain stock.
4
Therefore, the government of Ethiopia (GoE) requested the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) to undertake a study to analyze possible options for addressing vulnerability to 
shocks and food insecurities. The idea of setting up a strategic reserve was an outcome of that study. The 
underlying logic was that since the country was structurally deficit, production shocks were recurrent, and 
the infrastructure and institutions were weak, the government had to be prepared to protect the poor and 
vulnerable at times of scarcity. Given the level of infrastructure, institutions, and other constraints, having 
an emergency stock was considered critical for national food security. This was the rationale for 
instituting strategic grain reserves in early 1980s and appears to remain valid even today. The frequency 
of shocks continues to be high, and the country has consistently needed food aid assistance to deal with 
the emergencies. During 1996–2008, food aid inflow to the country has ranged from roughly a quarter of 
a million tons in 1996 to about two million tons following drought in 2003 (Table 1). In recent years, 
EFSRA has played important roles in managing the aftermath of droughts and emergencies. EFSRA was 
the only immediate source of food supplies in the 1999–2000 and 2002–2003 drought years, and both 
government and relief agencies heavily relied on the reserves to combat the unusually sharp increase in 
food prices during 2008–2009. In September of 2008, the EFSRA stock declined from more than 200,000 
tons to only about 17,000 tons. Clearly, things would have been worse if the country did not have the 
emergency reserve.  
 However, the drought of 1973–1974 and subsequent famine, 
which claimed about 200,000 lives, made it clear that the grain stocks accumulated as part of agricultural 
price policies were not enough to address the country’s food emergencies.  
Table 1. Production and food aid in Ethiopia, 1996-2008 
Year  Total Grain 
Production 
Total Food Aid 
Deliveries 




  ('000 Metric tons)  ('000 Metric tons)     
1996  10,327.9  244  2.4  0.18 
1997  10,436.8  228  2.2  0.18 
1998  8,102.7  444  5.5  0.14 
1999  8,866.9  473  5.3  0.15 
2000  9,233.6  1,231  13.3  0.15 
2001  11,039.2  980  8.9  0.17 
2002  10,371.4  266  2.6  0.16 
2003  11,536.3  1,887  16.4  0.17 
2004  10,626.9  732  6.9  0.15 
2005  12,573.9  1,004  8.0  0.17 
2006  14,411.6  552  3.8  0.19 
2007  15,572.5  285  1.8  0.20 
2008  16,871.9  626  3.7  0.22 
Source: Authors’ calculations from GoE data. 
                                                       
4 For details, see Webb and von Braun (1994) and Lirenso (1994).  3 
Although it recommended setting up emergency reserves, the first FAO study did not present an 
implementation plan. Therefore, a second study was conducted in 1979, which recommended building a 
stock of 60,000 metric tons within one year and 180,000 metric tons within four years. Following this 
recommendation, the GoE established EFSRA in 1982 as an additional unit of the Relief and 
Rehabilitation Commission. Subsequently, a joint study conducted by the World Food Programme (WFP) 
and the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) of the United Kingdom recommended revising 
stock levels to 204,600 metric tons in 1987. The study came to this conclusion based on the assumption 
that at least 95 percent of the food-insecure populations need to be protected by providing a ration of 400 
grams of cereal per capita per day for a period of four months, which is considered to be the necessary 
lead time to import and distribute the food to beneficiaries. Food or cash aid involve two lead times: one 
represents the time between flash appeal to actual pledge by the donors and the other is time between the 
pledge and actual imports.  
Institutionally, EFSRA went through a significant change in October 1992, when the prime 
minister, in his capacity as the chairman of the council of ministers, issued a legal directive establishing 
EFSRA as an autonomous agency with significant changes in its operational procedures. The primary 
mechanism to respond to emergencies was now the provision of inventory loans to well-established relief 
and rehabilitation agencies working in the country. The objective was to facilitate relief agencies’ 
operations in case of temporary shortages in their working stocks if there was a guarantee of repayment 
within an agreed-upon time. However, the new operational manual did not rule out the possibility of free 
drawdown, as was the case earlier, if the scale of emergency was larger and the primary mechanism 
failed. In other words, the new operational guideline kept the provision for other food security programs, 
such as safety nets and price stabilization programs, to withdraw from the reserve in case of large-scale 
emergencies.  
Following the droughts of 2002–2003, the reserve level was re-examined and a new stock level 
was established at 407,000 metric tons in 2004. The increase in stock was largely dictated by the increase 
in the number of food-insecure people in the country and the old assumption that it would take four 
months to reach the beneficiaries with a new shipment of food to the country. Before launching this study, 
IFPRI organized a stakeholders’ consultation that was attended by the representatives from EFSRA, 
Disaster Risk Management and Food Security Section (DRMFSS), nongovernmental organizations 
(NGOs), and national research organizations. At the meeting, it was unofficially mentioned that a policy 
discussion was underway to increase strategic grain reserves to 1.5 million metric tons and to establish an 
enhanced mandate for EFSRA, which includes the agency’s larger contribution to price stabilization 
activities. As the subsequent sections will demonstrate, given current institutional setting and logistics, 
such a move can lead to a substantial loss of efficiency and an increase in subsidy bills, along with 
potential disruptive impacts on the grain markets. 
 4 
3.  ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES 
Organization and Management 
From the conceptualization phase, there was a deliberate attempt to keep the organizational structure of 
EFSRA thin, simple, and flexible to be able to respond to emergency needs. The agency is managed by a 
director general, who is in charge of overseeing five departments, namely, storage and distribution, 
quality control, finance, and audit and human resources departments (Figure 1). Under these departments 
are the major warehouses, which have their own manager, quality control officer, and storage and 
distribution officers—all overseen by the five central departments. The director general is also responsible 
for overseeing seven warehouse branch managers, located in different parts of the country. Each 
warehouse has its own quality control office, administration and finance, and storage and distribution 
officers and clerks.  

















Source: Based on the EFSRA operations manual.  
EFSRA’s major policy guidance and decision making are guided by the board, which is chaired 
by the head of the DRMFSS, and the members include the general manager of EFSRA and the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Development (MoFED), Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), and the Ministry of 
Trade (MoT) High-level representation of public officials in the EFSRA board is a reflection of the 
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general manager of EFSRA is given the authority to release up to 5,000 tons of grain at a time, with a 
total of up to 25,000 tons if requested by any recognized relief agency. For larger amounts, the general 
manager is required to receive approval from a technical committee composed of the general manager of 
EFRSA, representatives from Ethiopian Grain Trading Enterprise (EGTE), the WFP, and a representative 
on behalf of the NGOs engaged in emergency operations. The technical committee has the authority to 
approve 5,000–25,000 metric tons, provided that the total outstanding grain loan approved by the 
committee does not exceed 100,000 metric tons.  
If reserve levels drop to or below 25 percent of the targeted total stock of 407,000 metric tons, 
neither the EFSRA manager nor the technical committee can make any decision regarding stock release. 
At that point, stock release can only be approved by the EFSRA board. If emergencies are acute, the relief 
agencies can call for an emergency meeting with the board for faster action; the board can then decide on 
the size of stock release. Although this has been rare, the board has indeed made such interventions 
during the acute crisis of 2008. In summation, the organizational structure and the management of 
EFSRA reflect the high level of GoE commitment; at the same time, they are flexible enough to promptly 
respond to emergency needs of varying degrees.  
Operational Guidelines and Capacity Utilization 
A key distinction between EFSRA of Ethiopia and the reserves of many other countries is that EFSRA it 
does not engage itself with buying, selling, transporting, and distribution of grain. Instead, the agency 
serves as the custodian of the stock, built through donor and government contributions. More specifically, 
when the target stock level of 407,000 tons was determined, government and donors made pledges to 
build up that stock, mainly through food aid and imports. This is a one-time procurement exercise. Once 
the stock level is reached, the national and international agencies can borrow from the EFSRA with a 
guarantee that they will replenish the stock within an agreed-upon time period. The main responsibility of 
EFSRA is to manage the lending and replenishment of stock according to its operational guideline. All 
transactions have to follow strict procedures set by the EFSRA executive board. To that end, the operation 
manual of the EFSRA states, “The organization requesting the loan should be legally recognized, engaged 
in relief activities, enter into obligation to cover all transactions costs (for example, loading, unloading, 
and weighing) both at the time of procurement and at the time of repayments.” In addition, borrowing 
from EFSRA requires that (1) the relief agency does not have previous record of default in repaying the 
grain and (2) any request for borrowing has to come from the heads of the respective agency and needs to 
be backed by a letter of guarantee from an additional donor or government agency.  
Although the EFSRA’s target stock level is 407,000 metric tons, it has only seven warehouses 
with an effective capacity of 285,000 metric tons (Table 2). Monthly stock data by storage site indicate 
that, on average, EFSRA held a stock of 179,000 tons during 2004–2009, which is about 63 percent of the 
effective capacity, 46 percent of total capacity, and 44 percent of the target stock level of 407,000 metric 
tons. At the warehouse level, capacity utilization rates have varied from only 25 percent in Shinile to 
roughly 80 percent in Nazareth and Woreta.  
   6 
Table 2. Capacity and utilization rate of warehouse, 2004-2009 
Warehouse  
Warehouse Capacity  Average Stock Level 
(2004–2009) 
Capacity 
Utilization   Rated   Effective  
  (metric tons)  (metric tons)  (percent)  
Nazareth  67,690  45,000  35,956  79.90 
Kombolcha  97,340  65,000  40,299  62.00 
Mekele  67,300  45,000  23,658  52.57 
Shashemene  37,440  25,000  17,947  71.79 
Shinile  39,440  25,000  6,437  25.75 
Wolayta Soddo  41,200  41,200  25,454  61.78 
Woreta  38,000  38,000  29,722  78.21 
National   388,410   284,200   179,472   63.15 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EFSRA data. 
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4.  OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE 
Maintaining food reserves is expensive. If the grain stocks are not managed efficiently, there are at least 
three potential adverse consequences: (1) large subsidies may be required to pay for the storage costs, (2) 
grain quality may deteriorate and can pose health risks to the poor households who receive these grains 
(or the children who are fed in school), and (3) when stock gets older, generally following good harvests, 
governments have to sell the grain to open markets, which can distort markets and adversely affect private 
sector incentives. Once a policy decision to hold a strategic grain stock is made, it is important to devise 
measures to minimize fiscal costs, ensure food safety, and reduce distortive impacts of stock policies on 
grain markets. A set of analyses have been carried to out to assess how EFSRA has performed with 
respect to these indicators. Assessing the optimality of stock is an obvious starting point because it greatly 
influences all performance indicators. Then we analyze three key aspects of stock management: (i) stock 
age, (ii) costs of holding stocks, and (iii) impacts of markets. Results are presented below. 
Determination of Stock Level 
Determination of optimal stock is complicated. Given the political sensitivity and the involvement of 
stakeholders with conflicting interests, it is difficult to generate an optimal stock estimate that is agreeable 
to all. As a result, the optimal grain stock has generally been determined either on an ad hoc basis or 
based on a very simple formula.5
Using the DRMFSS estimates of the food-insecure population, and assuming that at least 95 
percent of the food-insecure population needs to be covered in case of emergency, we have calculated the 
size of necessary grain reserves since the 1970s. The results, presented in Table 3, show that at optimal 
stock, estimates for the 1970s and 1980s (157,300 tons and 179,564 tons, respectively) are very similar to 
the respective official targets of 160,000 and 180,000 tons. However, the estimates start changing in early 
2000. For instance, the estimate for 2000–2004 is 362,322 tons, which is about 12 percent lower than the 
official target of 407,000 tons. The difference between these estimates and official estimates becomes 
more striking following the introduction of the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) in 2005. The 
number of people in need of food assistance declined significantly, primarily because a portion of the 
food-insecure population is now covered by the PSNP. During 2005–2009, maximum stock requirement, 
according to our calculation, would have been 287,000–302,000 tons, depending on what proportion of 
population in need of food assistance is expected to be covered in an emergency. Thus, we conclude that 
the current target level of 407,000 tons of strategic grain reserves is on the higher side and needs to be 
revised unless new programs are expected to be covered by EFSRA.  
 In Ethiopia, it has been the latter. When the country instituted EFSRA 
in 1982, the objective was to feed 3.7 million food-insecure people by providing them with 400 grams of 
grain a day for a period of four months. A minor change was made in 1987 following the WFP and 
Overseas Development Administration (ODA) study that proposed to cover 95 percent instead of 100 
percent of the food-insecure population.  
   
                                                       
5 See Goletti, Ahmed, and Chowdhury (1991) for Bangladesh, and Krishna and Chibber (1983) for India. 8 





Total Stock Requirement (in metric tons) 
Covering All of the Food-
Insecure Population 
Covering 95% of the Food-
Insecure Population 
1970s  3.25  157,300   149,435  
1980s  3.71  179,564   170,586  
1990s  4.61  223,124   211,968  
2000–2004  7.88  381,392   362,322  
Average (1970–2004)  4.86  235,345  223,578 
2005  2.72  131,648   125,066  
2006  2.58  124,848   118,606  
2007  3.36  162,624   154,493  
2008  4.60  222,640   211,508  
2009  6.24  302,127   287,020  
Average (2005–2009)   3.9  188,777  179,339 
Source: Authors’ calculations using DRMFSS data. 
There are at least three reasons why a stock revision may be justified. First, the assumption that it 
will take four months for food import to arrive might have changed over the years. The road infrastructure 
in Ethiopia has improved since early 2000 (Mogues, Ayele, and Paulos 2008), resulting in significant 
reduction in domestic transportation time and costs (Rashid and Negassa 2009). Second, the introduction 
of PSNP has substantially reduced the number of people in need of food assistance compared with earlier 
years. Therefore, unless PSNP and other safety net programs are scaled up and linked with EFSRA, the 
stock requirement will be smaller. Finally, Ethiopia has successfully addressed a series of emergencies (in 
1994, 1997, 1999, and 2003), with an average stock of about 200,000 tons in spite of the fact that the 
country did not have a large program like PSNP in those years. That is, although the target was 407,000 
tons, effective stock was much smaller in most of the months. Thus, unless EFSRA is linked with other 
justifiable food security programs, a stock level of 302,127 tons—that is, the upper bound of the estimates 
in Table 3 since 2005—should be optimal.  
Given the experiences of 2008–2009 emergencies, a proposal for revision in strategic reserve may 
not be appealing unless there is a clear understanding about the causes behind a sharp increase in prices. 
One of the key reasons for sharp price hikes in 2008–2009 was an inaccurate crop forecast and an 
interlinked estimate for the size of the food-insecure population, which is estimated through joint efforts 
of the early warning systems, relevant GoE agencies, and the Crop and Food Security Assessment 
Mission (CFSAM) of the FAO and WFP. Although this assessment has generally performed well, its 
forecasts were wrong for those years. This is clear from the fact that despite official projection of a 
double-digit growth in cereal production in the country, cereal prices increased sharply. This resulted not 
only in an increase of the food-insecure population but also in strong political pressure to stabilize food 
prices in the major urban centers through reintroduction of the rationing system. The end result was 






Figure 2. Quarterly EFSRA stocks by grain types, 2004–2008 
 
Source: Author’s compilation on EFSRA data 
Two macroeconomic policies further exacerbated the food price situations. During 2005–2007, 
money supply outpaced overall growth, resulting in overall nominal inflation (World Bank 2007). Given 
that the currency was overvalued, this brought domestic prices closer to the import parity. In early 2008, 
due to a sharp increase in fuel subsidy bills, the government encountered a balance of payment shortage. 
To combat this problem, Ethiopia’s central bank started rationing foreign exchange, which prevented the 
private sector from importing. As a result, domestic prices went way above the import parity. Figure 3, 
which presents export and import parity prices of wheat, illustrates how these played out in domestic 
markets at different time periods. It is interesting to note that domestic prices started increasing before the 
global food crisis, did not follow world prices during the global food crisis, and started increasing sharply 
long after world prices took a nosedive. Once there is a clear understanding that the 2008–2009 situations 
was an unusual one fueled by inaccurate forecasts and macroeconomic instability, it becomes easier to 
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Figure 3. Export and import parity prices of wheat in Ethiopia, 2006–2009 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on EGTE data. 
Stock Management 
Efficient management of stock is very important in reducing costs of operation, ensuring food safety, and 
minimizing market distortions. These aspects are assessed by carrying out two sets of analyses: (1) an 
assessment of stock age and (2) an analysis of the relationships among market supply, EFSRA stock 
release, and grain prices. Assessment of the stock age is guided by the hypothesis that the older the stock, 
the higher the costs and higher the likelihood of quality deterioration and contamination. Thus, this 
assessment not only provides costs of holding stock but gives some indication of the quality of grains that 
are distributed. On the other hand, the analysis of the relationship among stocks, market size, and prices 
gives us an idea about whether public stocks have any significant impacts of markets.  
Stock Age Analysis  
An ideal way to decompose grain stock by age would be to collect data from each warehouse by origin, 
arrival date, and date of distribution. Carrying out such surveys is very difficult and time-consuming; 
more importantly, in many instances, such surveys may not be able generate all the relevant information. 
In this study, we adopted an alternative method, as presented in Dorosh and Farid (2003) and Ahmed et 
al. (2004). According to this method, the amount of n-month-old stock in a given time, say t, can be 
calculated as closing stock at time t–n minus total distribution from period t–n + 1 through period t. For 
example, the amount of stock that is at least three months old at the end of April of a given year is 
calculated as the closing stock of January minus total distribution from February to April of that year. 
Note that this calculation is based on two strict assumptions: (1) that EFSRA stocks are rotated on a first-
in, first-out basis, which can be violated if there is a need for disposing of deteriorating stock or under 
unusual emergency situations, and (2) that stock received by any storage at any given time is at least one 
month old. The second assumption is also restrictive, especially for the transoceanic food aid shipments, 
which might be months old before they arrive at a specific EFSRA warehouse.  
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 4. The stock age calculations are done for all 
EFSRA warehouses for two separate periods, 2005–2006 and 2007–2008, by warehouse locations. For 
each warehouse, the first row presents the volume, the second row presents the volume of stock of a given 11 
age as a percentage of the total, and the third row presents the costs of holding the stock. The estimates of 
volume of stock by age suggest that EFSRA’s stock rotation has been quite efficient during these time 
periods. On average, none of the seven warehouses appear to have held stocks older than nine months. At 
the national level, about 62 percent of the stocks were less than or equal to three months old in 2007–
2008; this number was about 70 percent in 2005–2006. This is quite remarkable compared with countries 
in both Africa and Asia. For instance, using the same method of calculations, Kenyan warehouses appear 
to hold 33 percent of the stock for longer than nine months. In Bangladesh, where public food stocking 
has a long history, more than 10 percent of stocks were older than six months (Ahmed et al. 2004).  
Table 4. Analyses of EFSRA stock age and storage costs, 2005-2006 and 2007-2008  
      2005 to 2006  2007 to 2008 













Quantity (MT*)  46,406  17,731  1,072  24,689  5,881  2,740 
Percentage  71.2  27.2  1.6  74.1  17.7  8.2 
Storage cost**  382  292  26  337  161  112 
Mekele 
Quantity (MT)  19,108  5,624  —  7,430  5,435  3,063 
Percentage  65.1  33.1  1.8  46.7  34.1  19.2 
Storage cost   157  93    101  148  125 
Nazareth 
Quantity (MT)  26,233  13,350  741  11,414  2,488  — 
Percentage  65.1  33.1  1.8  82.1  17.9  0.00 
Storage cost  216  220  18  156  68  — 
Shashemene 
Quantity (MT)  10,462  6,308  —  4,121  1,349  — 
Percentage  62.4  37.6  0.00  75.3  24.7  0.00 
Storage cost   86  104  —  56  37  — 
Shinile 
(Dire Dawa) 
Quantity (MT)  10,797  798  —  2,788  1,781  134 
Percentage  59.3  37.9  2.8  59.3  37.9  2.8 
Storage cost   89  13  —  38  49  5 
Wolayta-
Soddo  
Quantity (MT)  18,025  8,752  —  8,544  1,452  — 
Percentage  85.5  14.5  0.00  85.5  14.5  0.00 
Storage cost   148  144  —  117  40  — 
Woreta  
Quantity (MT)  16,746  16,889  6,495  8,455  7,797  2,058 
Percentage  85.5  14.5  0.00  85.5  14.5  0.00 
Storage cost   138  278  160  115  213  84 
National 
Average  
Quantity (MT)  147,778  69,452  8,308  67,440  26,184  7,996 
Percentage  70.1  29.1  0.8  62.2  18.3  5.8 
  Storage cost   1,216  1,143  205  921  715  327 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EFSRA data. 
Notes: *MT = metric tons. 
**Storage costs at all warehouse locations are in thousand U.S. dollars. 
At the warehouse level, there are some variations in the composition of stocks by age from period 
to period. The only exception is Kombolcha, where more than 70 percent of the stocks have been less 
than or equal to three months old in both time periods. Except for Mekele in 2007–2008, stocks older than 
three months have never exceeded more than 50 percent of the total. Three out of seven warehouses did 
not have any stock older than six months. Among other warehouses, only Mekele and Kombolcha had 
roughly 3,000 tons of stock each that were older than six months. Thus, we conclude that EFSRA has 12 
been successful not only in addressing the emergencies but also in managing the stocks efficiently, which 
in turn has contributed to reducing food safety risks.  
Costs of Stock Holding 
The third row with each warehouse shows the costs of holding the stock of various ages. The costs 
reported in this table include (a) a finance charge that is calculated on the basis of the value of stock at the 
going market price and average lending rate of the National Bank of Ethiopia (12.5 percent), (b) EFSRA-
reported costs of fumigations, sorting, and other maintenance costs, and (c) the value of loss and waste 
due to moisture and infestations. Note that this calculation does not include rental costs of the 
warehouses, staff salaries, and the costs of internal transport, shipping, and handling (ITSH), which is 
estimated to be US$21 per metric tons in Bangladesh (Ahmed et al. 2004).6
Given the calculations in Table 4 and an assumed ITSH cost of US$21 per ton, per-unit costs of 
EFSRA grain stock can be calculated by warehouse and stock age. For example, during 2005–2006, the 
average quantity of stock that was less than three months old was 147,778 tons, and associated costs were 
US$1.22 million. That is, the per-ton cost of three-month-old stock in 2005–2006 was about US$8.25. If 
an ITSH of US$21 is added to each ton, the average cost becomes US$29.25. Similarly, the average cost 
of six-month-old and nine-month-old stock is estimated to be US$37.50 and US$45.70, respectively. At 
the national level, with ITSH included, weighted average costs of holding stocks are estimated to be 
US$32.40 per ton for 2005–2006 and US$40.32 per ton for 2007–2008, with a two-year weighted average 
of US$34.84 per ton. Note that this number depends on the stock rotation and can go up in years when a 
larger proportion of stocks are held for a longer period.  
 Therefore, if data were 
available on these costs and added to our analyses, per-unit storage costs would have gone up by a fixed 
percentage.  
Not many estimates are available on the cost of holding stocks. However, although the estimates 
are not strictly comparable, some comparisons can be made based on the data compiled for India (Chand 
2002) and Bangladesh (Dorosh 2009). For India, the average cost of wheat storage in 2000–2001 was Rs 
2410 per metric ton, which is equivalent to about US$60 per ton at 2000–2001 exchange rates. However, 
this includes labor costs and other administrative costs that are not included in our analysis for Ethiopia. If 
these labor and administrative costs are subtracted (a total of Rs 990) from the total, the estimated cost of 
storage becomes US$35.40 per ton. For Bangladesh, the total storage cost of rice is estimated to be 
US$44.30 per ton. However, this estimate includes administrative costs and the costs of quality 
deterioration, which are not available for Ethiopia. Assuming that quality deterioration and administrative 
costs accounted for 20 percent of the total, a comparable amount for Bangladesh would be US$35.44 per 
ton. Thus, we conclude that EFSRA has been as efficient in managing stocks as the South Asian countries 
with similar programs.  
Strategic Reserves and Grain Markets  
While any grain reserve program will involve subsidies and crowd out private trade, actual impacts of 
stock on market price depend on the purpose of a grain reserve program. In fact, it is possible for a grain 
reserve program not to have any price-depressing effects when governments hold the stock only to 
stabilize prices at a time of production shortfalls or other supply disruptions. In this case, the government 
replaces the private imports that would have occurred in the absence of government control, ceteris 
paribus. The logic is that since there is no change in net supply, there should not be any change in price. 
What if there were no shortages for a few years in a row? In such a situation, the government would have 
to rotate the stocks, and the only option to do so would be to sell the old stock and buy an equal amount 
of new stock so as to leave the net supply of grain, and market prices, unchanged. Even though this is 
theoretically possible, such a situation would be an operational nightmare and financially expensive. To 
illustrate, consider Ethiopia’s decision to increase their stock level to 1.5 million metric tons. Now 
                                                       
6 This is what WFP pays to the Government of Bangladesh as ITSH costs.  13 
suppose the government sells its old stock to private traders in exchange for an equal amount of new stock 
at a prevailing trade margin, which is about 12 percent according to recent surveys.7
In contrast, if the government holds large stocks to support public works, emergencies, and safety 
net programs, there will clearly be price-depressing effects. The magnitude of these effects will depend on 
(a) size of stock, (b) timing of distribution, and (c) targeting of beneficiaries. If the stock is too small, it 
will fail to achieve the emergency response objective. On the other hand, if it is too large, not only will 
the program be too expensive, but it will also crowd out private stocks and depress market prices. 
Crowding out private storage can also have harmful impacts on the private sector because releasing of the 
stock creates uncertainties and destroys arbitrage and storage incentives of the private traders. The timing 
of the distribution is also important. If stock is distributed equally every month to a group of beneficiaries, 
price-depressing impacts on markets will be much smaller compared with a situation where a large 
volume of grain is released to the markets in a short period of time. Finally, targeting efficiency is an 
important determinant of how market prices will change in response to public distribution through safety 
net programs. One extreme possibility is that targeting is perfect and hence there is no impact on the 
market prices. In other words, the program targeted the beneficiaries who were not buying any cereals 
from markets, and they would have starved had the government not included them in the program. 
Clearly, this is a very unlikely scenario.  
 Assuming an 
average price of US$200 a ton, this would imply a total direct cost of US$36 million just to rotate the 
stock, leaving aside the indirect costs of crowding out and other distortive effects of the program on 
markets.  
A more likely scenario is one where beneficiaries increase their consumption after becoming 
program participants. One way to measure such changes is to estimate the marginal propensity to 
consume (MPC). We have not come across such estimates for Ethiopia, but del Ninno and Dorosh (2003) 
present MPC estimates for a number of targeted programs in Bangladesh. Their results suggest that these 
estimates range from zero for a self-targeted Food for Works program, to 0.50 for a Food for Education 
program, with an estimate of 0.32 for all programs. These numbers have important implications in 
understanding the impact of Strategic Grain Reserve (SGR) stocks on market prices. For an illustration, 
consider a poor household that buys and consumes 10 kgs of wheat before becoming a program 
beneficiary. An MPC of 0.32 implies that this household will increase consumption by 32 percent of its 
original consumption. Therefore, if the household receives 15 kgs of wheat from the program, it will 
consume 13.2 kgs (a 32 percent increase from original consumption of 10 kgs) and sell the remaining 1.8 
kgs. Since this household will no longer have to buy from the market, net supply will increase by 11.8 kgs 
due to its program participation.  
Using these MPC estimates, along with assumptions about elasticities and timing of distribution, 
we have carried out some simulations to examine the impacts of various stock holding on market prices; 
the results are presented in Table 5. The first two rows show the results for the case where MPC = 0, and 
the last two rows shows the results where MPC = 0.32. Consider the results in the first two rows. If the 
EFSRA stock remains at the current level, and an equal amount of grain is distributed every month, 
market prices will be depressed only by 2.18 percent if prices are considered relatively elastic (0.6), and 
by 3.27 percent if prices are relatively inelastic (0.4). In contrast, if the stock is distributed equally during 
the six-month lean period, the prices will be depressed by larger magnitudes of 4.36 to 6.55 percent. The 
price-depressing effects become more striking if the stock level is raised to 1.5 million tons, as is being 
currently discussed by the government. The estimated reduction in market price will be 18 to 28 percent if 
the stock is distributed in an equal amount every month, and 37 to 55 percent if distributed during the six 
lean months. When the MPC is assumed to be 0.32, the price-depressing effects become smaller. 
However, notice that impacts of raising the stock level can still be high.  
 
                                                       
7 This is estimated from two rounds of traders’ survey data collected by IFPRI in 2002 and 2008, respectively.  14 
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407, 000 tons   2.18  4.36  3.27  6.55 
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SGR stock = 
407, 000 tons   1.48  2.97  2.23  4.45 
SGR stock = 
1.5 million tons  12.53  25.05  18.79  37.58 
Source: Authors’ estimates. 15 
5.  LINKS BETWEEN STRATEGIC RESERVE AND OTHER  
FOOD SECURITY PROGRAMS  
Coordination between strategic reserves and other food security programs is important not only for the 
efficiency of grain reserves but also for the overall functioning of all food security programs of a country. 
In Ethiopia, the efficiency of stock rotation and the associated cost reductions have been high primarily 
because most of the food-based intervention programs in the country are well-coordinated with EFSRA. 
In this section, we provide some empirics on how EFSRA serves various food security programs and how 
its roles are changing, as well as a discussion on the current status and future potential for linking with 
school feeding programs.  
Emergency Programs 
Consistent with its mandates, EFSRA has proved to be successful in addressing emergencies in several 
instances since the 1990s. During the food security crisis of 1994, the agency responded in timely manner 
by releasing about 94,000 tons of grain on loan to NGOs and 52,000 tons in free drawdowns to the 
government relief agencies. These interventions helped mitigate food shortages in the northern and 
southern parts of the country, prevented migration toward urban centers, and protected smallholders’ 
livelihoods (FAO 2004). Following the belg crop failure in 1997 was an unexpectedly acute need for 
emergency relief operation; the government, WFP, and many NGOs went to EFSRA to borrow grain for 
immediate emergency distributions. EFSRA was also the immediate source of food relief during the 
drought of 1999–2000; it came to the rescue again in 2003, when a food security crisis after two 
consecutive years of bumper harvests caught everyone off guard.  
Things started changing with the introduction of PSNP in 2005, which coincided with rising food 
prices in the country. During 1994–2009, the share of emergency distribution in total withdrawal from 
EFSRA was 74 percent, followed by 21 percent for safety net programs
8
                                                       
8 Safety net programs include PNSP, Food for Work, and school feeding programs. 
 and about 5 percent for price 
stabilization. However, these numbers change quite substantially if the period is divided into pre- and 
post-PSNP—that is, 1994–2004 and 2005–2009. Since 2005, while withdrawals for safety net programs 
and price stabilization have jumped to 57 and 15 percent of the total withdrawal, respectively, the 
emergency operations share has dropped drastically to an average of only 28 percent. Figure 4 shows how 
drastically withdrawal for emergency relief operations has declined in the past few years, including 
during the acute emergencies of 2008–2009.  16 
Figure 4. Trends in the withdrawal from EFSRA by program type, 1994-2009 
. 
Source: Authors’ creation. 
Note that in 2008; only 45,000 out of a total distribution of 212,000 tons went to emergency 
operation, which was less than half the amount withdrawn for price stabilization in major urban centers 
(95,000 tons). This drastic decline in withdrawal for emergencies does not imply that the scale of 
emergencies in 2008 was smaller than previous emergencies; it only reflects a shift in the priorities 
toward price stabilization. This was also the case for the safety net programs, especially for the PSNP, 
which dropped drastically after 2005. In fact, even the cash beneficiaries of PSNP demanded food instead 
of cash because cash could not buy as much food due to high cereal price inflation.  
PSNP and Food Reserve Needs 
Providing access to food to the poor through social safety net programs is a valid policy intervention, 
irrespective of economic ideology, functioning of markets, or even the level of development of a given 
country. However, there is a long-standing debate as to whether these transfers should be in kind or in 
cash (Coate 1989; Dreze and Sen 1990; Basu 1996). There is a consensus in the literature that cash 
transfers are more efficient if market locations are spatially integrated and financial institutions are well 
developed. On the other hand, food-based interventions are justified where markets are disintegrated. The 
assumption (in many cases, the reality) that markets are not efficient is perhaps the reason why safety nets 
and emergency programs in many countries continue to be food based.
9
However, apart from situations of extreme civil conflict or war, it is unlikely that market 
locations in all parts of a given country would be isolated from major central markets. This implies that in 
most cases, it should be possible to implement a mix of food- and cash-based safety net or emergency 
assistance programs. Cash transfer programs could be implemented in more developed geographic 
locations, where transaction costs are low and cash injection is likely to create demand for local products 
yet not raise food prices excessively. Food transfer programs could be implemented in more remote 
places where markets are thin (not integrated with locations in surplus regions), so as to avoid possible 
surges in food prices in local markets from cash transfers that would adversely affect not only the 
households receiving social transfers but also poor non-beneficiaries (Basu, 1996).  
  
                                                       
9 Food aid donors’ desire to support their own domestic farmers and shippers is another major reason for preference for 






















































































































This was the underlying rationale behind introducing PSNP in Ethiopia in 2005. It was a strategic 
move on the part of the Ethiopian government toward reducing food aid dependence and integrating food 
security programs with an overall growth and poverty alleviation agenda. It was a bold undertaking on the 
part of Ethiopian government in terms of both size, the largest of its kind in sub-Saharan Africa, and 
institutional design that combined both cash and food transfers. The program targets transfers to poor 
households through public works and direct support, with public works accounting for the larger share of 
the total program budgets. Beneficiaries in the locations with good market access were paid 6 Ethiopian 
birr (ETB) per day (about US$0.75 at 2005 exchange rate) for their labor on labor-intensive public 
projects. On the other hand, the beneficiaries in the remote areas were paid 3 kgs of wheat or maize.
10
Despite honest intention and innovative program design, the PSNP faced an immediate challenge 
when cereal price inflation started skyrocketing. A critical challenge in implementing cash-based safety 
net programs is ensuring that the values of transfers remain the same over time. Doing so becomes 
particularly difficult in a high-inflation macroeconomic environment, because frequently adjusting for 
inflation is extremely difficult, if not impossible. When PSNP was launched, the Ethiopian economy was 
largely characterized by low inflation, which started changing in 2006. The food component of the 
national consumer price index increased from about 8 percent in 2003 to 19 percent in 2006, with an 
average annual increase of about 13 percent (World Bank 2007). Inflation continued at approximately 20 
percent in 2007, but since has further accelerated, with total inflation approaching 100 percent for 
calendar year 2008.  
  
In spite of this high inflation rate, however, the amount of the cash transfer (ETB 6, or US$0.70) 
remained the same until December 2007, causing severe erosion of benefits to the households receiving 
cash transfers. Figure 5, constructed with PSNP woreda-level data, illustrate this fact. It plots the wheat 
equivalent of cash transfers (meaning the amount of wheat ETB 6 could buy), the wheat equivalent of 
daily agriculture wage, and the size of food transfers (3 kgs of wheat per day) represented by the 
horizontal line. To examine how cash transfers fared with food transfers, compare the shaded area 
showing the wheat equivalent of cash transfers with of the solid line of the wheat at 3 kgs per day that 
remained constant.  
Figure 5. Rural real wage (wheat equivalent) and PSNP transfer 
 
Source: Rashid and Taffesse, 2009. 
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Clearly, recipients of cash transfers fared better than those of food transfers only during the first 
few months, when the cash (ETB 6) could buy more than 3 kgs of wheat. The real benefits of cash started 
eroding in May 2005 but continued deteriorating until daily cash transfer was increased from ETB 6 to 
ETB 8 in late 2007. Even after increasing cash transfers from ETB 6 to ETB 8, the real value of cash in 
February 2008 was about 60 percent of the value of transfers in January–May 2005. Given this level of 
erosion, it is obvious that all cash recipients would have switched to food if they had a choice. The key 
lesson from this experience is that cash-based safety net programs have their share of problems. Unless 
these kinds of programs have the flexibility to quickly adjust the size of cash transfers or to switch from 
cash to food, there will be inequality in benefits, which perhaps will defeat the purpose of the program. 
Such risks can be mitigated if there is an efficient and responsive strategic reserve system in place.  
School Feeding 
Although the global development community has a growing interest in school feeding programs, the size 
of these programs remains very small in Ethiopia. According to available data, WFP covers about 
451,797 students between the ages of 7 and 14 under its current school feeding program. Each student 
covered by this program receives 120 grams of blended food, 3 grams of vegetable oil, and 6 grams of 
salt per day for a total of 120 days per year. Table 6 presents the summary of the program in terms of 
geographic coverage, total food distribution, and per capita food distribution. Notice that although size of 
the program has increased slightly, total food distribution in the school feeding program has been only 
4,986 metric tons in 2008 and 8,194 in 2009, with a two-year average of 6,590 tons.  
Table 6. School feeding program in Ethiopia, 2008-2009 
Region  
Total Beneficiaries (7–14)  Total Food Distributed   Per Capita Distribution 
2008  2009  Total   2008  2009  Average   2008  2009  Average  
     metric tons   kg/student/year  
Tigray  83,865  83,865  83,865  1,403  1,924  1,663  16.725  22.944  19.835 
Afar  32,711  48,697  40,704  521  951  736  15.942  19.529  18.088 
Amhara  127,954  145,533  136,744  1,353  2,536  1,945  10.574  17.426  14.220 
Oromiya  95,063  113,892  104,478  485  1,006  745  5.105  8.829  7.134 
Somali  43,705  42,330  43,018  644  769  707  14.739  18.177  16.430 
SNNPR  38,504  47,474  42,989  580  1,008  794  15.050  21.233  18.464 
National  421,802  481,791  451,797  4,986.0  8,194.2  6,590.1  11.821  17.008  14.586 
Source: Compiled from WFP-Ethiopia data.   
Note: SNNPR = Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region. 
This is simply too small in terms of both the magnitude of the problem and the overall size of the 
grain markets in Ethiopia. According to Ministry of Education statistics, presented in Table 7, total 
enrollment of students ages 7–14 is roughly 14.5 million. That is, the program coverage (451,797 
students) was only 3 percent of the total enrollment. If only the children of the poor families are 
considered, total enrollment in 2009 was 4.25 million, which is almost 10 times more than the current 
coverage of 451,797 students. These are the students who go to school hungry and often drop out after 
falling behind because of the pressing need to support their families. In addition to limited coverage, the 
size of rations also appears to be very small. To illustrate, let us consider a child between the ages of 10 
and 14 who can work in an agricultural field and earn ETB 6 a day, which can buy 2 kgs of wheat at the 
market price. This implies that a ration of 120 grams of blended food in a school feeding program will be 
much smaller than what this child could earn as an agricultural worker. Given the family’s pressing needs, 
parents will mostly decide to take their children out of school under such circumstances because the 
opportunity cost of keeping their children in school (short term) would be high.  19 
Table 7. Enrollment of students, ages 7 -14, by region, 2009 
Region  
Ownership  Location   Poor  
Children  NGOs  Government  Total   Urban   Rural   Total  
Tigray  37,865  943,319  981,184  170,216  810,968  981,184  287,487 
Afar   4,100  52,624  56,724  14,427  42,297  56,724  16,620 
Amhara   55,427  3,702,117  3,757,544  559,023  3,198,521  3,757,544  1,100,960 
Oromiya   111,433  5,230,928  5,342,361  1,050,127  4,292,234  5,342,361  1,565,312 
Somali   13,008  315,212  328,220  115,962  212,258  328,220  96,168 
Benishangul   2,229  140,909  143,138  39,005  104,133  143,138  41,939 
SNNPR  132,135  3,190,491  3,322,626  518,308  2,804,318  3,322,626  973,529 
Gambela   2,048  68,469  70,517  18,484  52,033  70,517  20,661 
Harari   1,969  33,626  35,595  18,752  16,843  35,595  10,429 
A. Ababa   208,258  181,848  390,106  388,658  1,448  390,106  114,301 
Dire Dawa   9,747  43,816  53,563  31,586  21,977  53,563  15,694 
Total  578,219  13,903,359  14,481,578  2,924,548  11,557,030  14,481,57
 
4,243,102 
Source: Ministry of Education, GoE. 
Note: SNNPR = Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region. 
A plausible range of food requirements can be calculated based on the regional poverty estimates 
and various levels of coverage. For example, consider a program that tries to bring all poor children 
between the ages of 7 and 14 under the school feeding program. Given that there are 4.25 million poor 
children in the country within that age cohort, it will require roughly 62,000 tons of blended food at the 
current level of ration (120 grams for 120 days). If the coverage for poor children is increased from 120 
days to 200 days, the requirement goes up to 101,834 tons. If the girls are given a take-home ration of 
12.5 kgs per month for 10 months, as is the case in the new Malawi program, the estimated additional 
requirement will be roughly 348,000 tons (Table 8). 
There will be an additional requirement if children over age 12 are provided a take-home ration to 
prevent them from dropping out of school. If we assume the number of students each year from ages 7 to 
14 to be the same, the total number of poor students between the ages of 12 and 14 would be roughly 1.8 
million. If we further assume that their opportunity costs of staying at school are ETB 6 per day during 
the three peak months, equivalent to 2 kgs of wheat, the total additional requirement would be 218,216 
tons. Thus, to feed the poor children in Ethiopian schools would require a total of 568,216 metric tons. 
This represents a substantial latent demand of food in the country; meeting this demand not only will help 
keep children in school and improve labor productivity in the future, but also has the potential to 
contribute to market development. 
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Table 8. Food requirement for school feeding programs 
Region  
Total Food Requirement under Various Scenarios 
All primary  
school children 
Government 
primary schools  
Rural  
primary schools  
Poor  
children  
   (quantities in metric tons per year)  
Tigray   84,059    80,815    69,477    24,629  
Afar    3,936    3,651    2,935    1,153  
Amhara    317,855    313,166    270,566    93,131  
Oromiya    430,140    421,168    345,589    126,031  
Somali    23,692    22,753    15,321    6,942  
Benishangul    11,090    10,917    8,068    3,249  
SNNPR   268,447    257,771    226,571    78,655  
Gambela    5,452    5,294    4,023    1,597  
Harari    2,844    2,687    1,346    833  
Addis Ababa    36,372    16,955    135    10,657  
Dire Dawa    4,359    3,566    1,788    1,277  
Total   1,188,244  1,138,742  945,819  348,156 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: SNNPR = Southern Nations, Nationalities, and People’s Region. 21 
6.  SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
Strategic grain reserves have received considerable policy attention following the 2007–2008 global food 
crisis. This paper has examined the institutional design and operational performance of such a program 
using the case study of Ethiopia. Overall, the study concludes that EFSRA has performed well in terms of 
addressing emergencies and managing the stocks efficiently. It has proved effective in addressing 
emergencies in several occasions since mid-1990s and has effectively managed the grain stocks. The 
study finds that about 62–70 percent of the EFSRA stocks were less than three months old during 2005–
2006 and 2007–2008, with associated holding costs of US$34.84 per metric ton. This shows a level of 
stock management efficiency that is better than that in several countries in Africa and Asia for which 
similar analyses were carried out.  
The success of EFSRA has resulted from three key features of the program design. The first 
important feature is the organizational structure and management of EFSRA, which reflects a high level 
of government commitment, participation of key stakeholders, and clearly defined rules of procurement 
and distribution. Second, unlike similar programs in many other countries, EFSRA does not engage in 
buying and selling of cereals. Instead, it serves as a custodian of the grain, with the key responsibility of 
lending grain to relevant government and nongovernmental agencies following well-defined official 
guidelines. Finally, EFSRA has been successful because it has maintained a reasonably smaller stock with 
very little impact on the market prices. This will change if the stock level is increased significantly. In 
particular, the results suggest that increasing stock for price stabilization purposes will depress domestic 
prices, increase the costs, and adversely affect the evolving private sector in the cereal value chain, where 
millions of people make their living.  
The paper argues that there is still room for improvement with respect to EFSRA’s  linkages with 
safety net programs and stock optimality. The school feeding program is very small in the country. 
During 2008–2009, total food distribution under school feeding programs averaged only 6,590 tons. This 
is miniscule compared with Ethiopia’s needs, given that the country has almost 14.5 million children 
between the ages of 7 and 14 enrolled in school. Even if only poor children are covered under the school 
feeding programs, the additional demand for food could be as high as 568,000 tons per year. This is a 
large demand for a justifiable intervention, which not only will keep children in school and increase the 
nation’s future labor productivity but also can contribute to generating local demand and boosting food 
processing sectors. Given stable prices and the right policy environment, this will also trigger a supply 
response that can potentially generate benefits for the smallholders in the country.  22 
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